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How to Respect the Will of Mentally Ill Persons
Theda Rehbock
Institute of Philosophy, Dresden University of Technology
In this article I oppose the current account of autonomy and informed consent in
bioethics through criticising the four underlying prejudices of an objectivistic, du-
alistic, rationalistic and individualistic misunderstanding of the will. With special
regard to the case of patients with dementia I argue for the thesis that the princi-
ple of autonomy, as moral principles in general, has unconditional and universal
validity, but has to be applied dierently in the face of specic situations and cir-
cumstances bymeans of the power of judgment (Urteilskra). As the philosophical
resp. anthropological basis of my argument I develop a broad understanding of the
will in an Aristotelian and phenomenological sense.e practical consequences of
my thesis consist in the ethical requirement of equal respect for the will of mentally
ill patients.
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1. e practical relevance of the topic: respect for the will of the
patient
It is a widespread opinion in bioethics that the right to autonomy depends
on certain mental capacities, or the so-called competence of the patient. It
is, of course, reasonable not to fulll the wishes of someone who is not able
to understand and judge the preconditions, possible consequences, risks, or
alternatives of her or his own decisions. It is also necessary to observe very
carefully, especially in the case of mentally ill persons, what these persons
are still able to do and to decide on their own, and to what extent they need
assistance, surrogate decision making, and in special cases even paternalis-
tic intervention. But it is, in my view, wrong to conclude from the fact of
diminished or lacking mental capacities that the moral status of a person
and the right to have one’s will respected are diminished or lacking as well,
according to the degree of the capacities. My thesis is that the moral status
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and the fundamental principles, rights and claims it implies are uncondi-
tionally valid and apply to any situation of human life, even aer death.1 But,
of course, they apply in a dierent manner according to the special circum-
stances of the situation, including the mental state of the person concerned.
According to Kant, moral principles have unconditional and universal va-
lidity based on non-empirical (a priori) grounds. But in order to apply them
appropriately in the face of specic situations and circumstances we need
“a power of judgment (Urteilskra) sharpened by experience” (Kant 1997,
5). us, the obligation of respect for the autonomy and will of others is as
valid in the case of a dead or demented person as it is in the case of living
and mentally healthy persons. Only how the will can and has to be assessed
and respected is dierent depending on empirical capacities, conditions, and
circumstances of the concerned persons and their situation.
In the present paper I will argue for this thesis with special regard to the
situation of persons suering from dementia.eir mental abilities become
continuously more limited and deranged. As with children, they are oen
not able to fully and adequately assess the risks and consequences of their
decisions and actions. erefore others, so-called surrogate decision mak-
ers, have to decide and act on their behalf and in their best interest. Never-
theless, the question arises whether demented persons who are assessed as
“incompetent” cannot still express their will and their desires through their
verbal or non-verbal (bodily) behavior; for example, through rejecting food
and medication, pulling out feeding tubes, or through dancing, singing and
playing.eir thus expressed will and desiresmay appear less rational, com-
petent and reected. ey may appear incomprehensible and irrational in
the view of their caregivers, or as inconsistent with their own former views
and values. And it may be much more necessary to carefully interpret their
behavior in order to grasp the will or desire they are expressing. But is there
any reason why their will and desire should be less respected and taken into
account? And should “incompetent” persons have less right to behave and
decide irrationally or inconsistently than “competent” persons?
is question gains special—moral and legal—importance regarding the
danger of wrongful paternalism and even violent behavior towards the per-
sons suering from mental disorder, as well as regarding the application of
advance directives in the case of dementia. On the one hand, caregivers who
only intend to protect the patient from harm or to care for their well-being
are inclined to neglect and violate the will of the demented, for example, by
compulsory feeding against their resistance in order to prevent starving and
death, to constrain them and shut them up in order to prevent them from
1 Argumentation for the status of the person and respect for the will of the departed can be
found in (Rehbock 2012).
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accidents, colds, and other dangers. On the other hand, it may be that the
demented patient had, in the state of former competence before becoming
demented, declared the wish to die in the case of severe dementia through
foregoing treatment or even euthanasia insofar as it is a legal option. How-
ever, when actually starting to suer from dementia, he or she does not seem
unhappy with his or her situation at all. To the contrary, he or she seems to
enjoy the remaining way of life, and even discovers new options for enjoy-
ing life which he or she despised or suppressed during earlier life. A famous
current example in Germany is the case of the professor of rhetorics Walter
Jens, who had publicly argued and fought for the legalization of active eu-
thanasia and regarded dementia as incompatible with human dignity. Now
that he himself has dementia, his wife, Inge Jens, who formerly shared his
views and values regarding euthanasia and dementia, explains that he enjoys
activities which he formerly despised, such as living on a farm and playing
with animals. She experiences his present behavior as such an expression of
a will to live that she would be unable to end his life according to his former
wish. “Just as certain as we were then that we did not want to live like that,
I know today that my husband does not want to die” (Jens 2009). us, the
question arises whether such behavior can be understood as an expression
of a volition suspending the former rational will articulated in an advance
directive? Or can the former will only be suspended by an equally or almost
equally competent decision as was required for the advance directive itself?
Advance directives are regarded as a legal instrument which enables us to
extend our autonomy to situations in which we lack the competence for au-
tonomous decisions. For advance directives to be eective, it is required that
they are drawn up in a state of competence. e same is true in the case of
a suspension of an advance directive, even if it does not have to be made in
written form. But can the obviously life-arming behavior of the demented
person be entirely ignored? Should it not be regarded as an expression of a
will to live which some call a “natural will” (cf. Jox 2006, 2011)?
Several bioethicists deny that severely demented patients can express a
will at all. It is widely argued that a will in the proper sense is only one which
is based on rational grounds and can be linguistically communicated. What
is called a “natural will” seems to be nothing more than desires aiming at
immediate pleasure or at avoiding pain. Ronald Dworkin calls these desires
“experiential interests” (Dworkin 1994, chapter 7). Dworkin maintains that
the will and personality of an individual can only be expressed through “crit-
ical interests” (Dworkin 1994, chapter 7) which are based on a conscious and
rational evaluation of one’s life situation which the demented patient is in-
capable of any more. Only such a rational will seems to be a will in the strict
sense which has to be respected according to the biomedical principle of re-
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spect for autonomy. Following this position, there cannot be any collision
between two contrary volitions in case of advance directives, but only a con-
ict between the former autonomous will and the actual obligation of care
for the well-being of the dementia patient. In this conict, the respect for the
former will has priority over the obligation of care for the actual well-being
of the patient. As Dworkin says: “If I decide, when I am competent, that
it would be best for me not to remain alive in a seriously and permanently
demented state, then a duciary could contradict me only by exercising an
unacceptable form of moral paternalism” (Dworkin 1994, 231).
But is it right that the behavior of persons suering from severe demen-
tia cannot and should not be interpreted, acknowledged and respected as an
expression of their will at all? I do not think so. is question or problem
shows, as a good example, the importance of an accurate and dierentiated
philosophical analysis of underlying concepts for moral orientation and ac-
tion. Dworkin’s position presupposes a concept of will and autonomy which
is not totally wrong, but is too abstract and too narrow. As I intend to ar-
gue, the competence model of autonomy is based on at least four prejudices,
which I call objectivistic, rationalistic, dualistic and individualistic. Because
of these deciencies, the underlying concept of the will neglects the bodily
constitution of reason and language, and is therefore not suitable for ade-
quately comprehending the situation of mentally ill humans.
2. Critique of prejudices
2.1 From objectivism to the unconditional respect for the person
and the priority of communication
For the competencemodel of autonomy, in cases of doubt “the ability to per-
form a task” (Beauchamp and Childress 2009, 112) has to be tested accord-
ing to dened standards. is is usually done with the help of clinical de-
vices like “dementia rating scales” or “mental status exams”; “the assessment
of decisional competence remains heavily a matter of clinical judgment”
(Beauchamp and Childress 2009, 115). ese “competence judgments” are
supposed to have a “gatekeeping function” (Beauchamp and Childress 2009,
111) by distinguishing competent from incompetent persons resp. decisions.
ey imply “normative judgments” insofar as they “determine how to use
the test to sort persons into the two classes of competent and incompe-
tent, and, therefore, how persons ought to be or may permissibly be treated”
(Beauchamp and Childress 2009, 112). In the case of incompetent persons,
caregivers are obligated and entitled “to override that person’s decisions, to
turn to informal surrogates for decision making, to ask the court to appoint
a guardian to protect his or her interests, or to seek that person’s involuntary
institutionalization” (Beauchamp and Childress 2009, 111).us the princi-
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ple of autonomy has only “prima facie standing”; it does not apply to “per-
sons who cannot act in a suciently autonomousmanner” (Beauchamp and
Childress 2009, 105). Whether it applies or not depends on clinical assess-
ments of the mental abilities of persons.
Aside from a variety of problems which concern questions of the exact
denition and the determination of criteria of competence, a more funda-
mental ethical problem consists in the underlying objectivistic perspective.
From this perspective, the patient primarily appears as an object of medical
diagnosis and treatment before being respected as a person with the right to
determine and shape her own life. Opposing this standard model of auton-
omy, I want to argue for the primacy and unconditional validity of respect
for the person and her will. Assessments of mental capacities may be neces-
sary, and sometimes, in special cases of conict, it may even be unavoidable
to override the decision or to intervene in the behavior of a person who is
not able to judge the consequences and risks of her decisions and actions.
But paternalistic actions cannot be justied only on the basis of the princi-
ples of benecence and non-malecence. It can and must be assumed on
the basis of good reasons and indications that these actions, while oppos-
ing the actual statement of the will, still do not contradict the real will itself.
One has to be very careful, of course, in presupposing such a real will, which
diers from the actual statement or expression of the will. Nevertheless this
distinction is fundamental and necessary. Even in the case of clearly com-
petent persons, it must always be possible to ask: “Are you sure? You say
that you want to do or get X, but are you really willing X? Did you deliberate
well?” If arguing with the other person is not possible, we must at least be
very certain that he or she will or would consent to our paternalistic inter-
vention. Furthermore, the competence assessments themselves are medical
measurements which cannot be carried out against the persistent resistance
of the patient—without violating his or her will and dignity—even if this re-
sistance seems to be irrational and a manifestation of mental illness. us,
the validity and applicability of the principle of autonomy cannot be depen-
dent on competence judgments because this principle is the necessary basis
and presupposition of those judgments as well as of any possible justication
of paternalistic interventions.
As the statement of thewill can and should not be identiedwith thewill
itself, respect for autonomy can and should not be identied with respect
for the actual volitions or for the mental capability of making “autonomous
choices”. Instead, respect for autonomymeans respect for the person and her
real will, which generally has to be the basic attitude towards other human
beings even if they are unable to develop and communicate their will in a
fully competent and rational manner. Understood in this way, this respect
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serves as a guiding principle for our actions towards others in any situation,
even aer death, and all the more so in the state of coma or mental illness.
e idea of surrogate decision making implies this orientation towards the
will and the interest of the patient on behalf of whom one is deciding and
acting. Any care or benecence without respect for the will of the other per-
son necessarily implies wrongful paternalism and disregarding the person
and her dignity in the Kantian sense, since, for Kant, dignity means the un-
conditional worth of human beings as persons in contrast to mere things
which may serve merely as means.
Using the Aristotelian distinction between praxis and poiesis, the psy-
chiatrist and philosopherWolfgang Blankenburg explains this fundamental
dierence of attitude in the following way. Towards mere things, we have an
attitude ofmanagement and control through dening, categorizing, causally
explaining, and eliminating of disorders. Towards humans, by contrast, the
primary, unconditional interest has to be to understand and respect them as
independent, autonomous beings, even in the case of severemental disorder,
and to help and enable them to live and master their own life and decien-
cies. According to Blankenburg, freedom and autonomy are the guiding
ideas of action towards mentally ill persons as well as healthy persons. In
his Prolegomena to a Psychopathology of Freedom, he says: “e inner free-
dom of the human being is the secret, although unavoidable reference point,
for every psychopathology and psychotherapy” (Blankenburg 1984, 174). In
his view, the impressive progress of medicine in exploring and controlling
mental disorders with the help of new technical means implies the danger
that this technical-poietic view could come to dominate, or even override the
personal perspective, and thereby promote the disregard of the person and
the dignity of the patient.
erefore, the question is not if the will of a person has to be respected,
but only how this is to be done. One central requirement of respect con-
sists in giving the highest priority to the praxis of communication with the
person concerned. e denition, categorization, causal explanation, and
elimination of disorders as well as clinical assessments of mental abilities
may be necessary, but can only be justied on the condition of a commu-
nicative relation to the patient as a person. is means that those who care
for patients are and necessarily remain involved themselves as personalities
with their own emotions, values and judgments in the situation and cannot
take up an entirely disengaged, clinical, impersonal standpoint of mere ob-
servation.is is true in the case of the “competent” as well as in the case of
the “incompetent” patient.
Adequately informing the “competent” patient is a precondition for the
validity of his or her informed consent and cannot be reduced to the imper-
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sonal transfer of bare facts and information “owing from one place to an-
other” (Manson and O’Neill 2007, viii).2 Instead it has to be decided which
facts and information are adequate and relevant for the specic, individual
situation and needs of the patient. Such a decision presupposes empathetic
understanding and evaluation of this situation, putting oneself in the shoes
of the other person, and adopting his or her position or perspective. is is
only possible through personal communication and reection on one’s own
values, which may be dierent to the other’s values. us, information al-
ready implies evaluation and is already an essential part of the activity of
caring, based on the principle of benecence which is a necessary precondi-
tion for respecting and enabling the autonomy of the patient.
e same is all the more true for the clinical assessment of “incompe-
tence”, which can and should never be a merely impersonal, disengaged,
and descriptive statement. Wemust have reasons and indications for doubts
about the mental health of others which can only appear in our communi-
cation with them. e more we fail to understand the behavior of the other
person, the more it seems irrational to us, the more we doubt his or her
“competence.” But wemust always take into account the possibility that what
seems irrational to us may be very rational from the perspective of the other
person. It is never possible to get a fully objective account of the subjective
standpoint and motivation of others. erefore, communication has abso-
lute priority over any form of objectication in our relations to others. It is
false to say, as Peter F. Strawson and others do, that it is impossible to take
on the “participant attitude” in the case of “mentally deranged”, “abnormal”
or “incapacitated” people, and that instead only the “objective attitudes” of
“intellectual understanding, management, treatment, and control” (Straw-
son 2008, 17) are adequate for dealing with them.3 It may, in special cases,
be very dicult to understand the strange behavior of mentally ill persons
but it is not impossible, as I will try to argue in the following.
How, then, can we communicate with these persons and how is it pos-
sible to ascribe a will to them which has to be respected? In order to un-
2 In this book, Neil C. Manson and Onora O’Neill fundamentally criticize current ap-
proaches to informed consent in bioethics, which in their view tend to regard the informa-
tion process between doctor and patient according to a misleadingmetaphor, as an imper-
sonal quasi-technical “transfer or transmission of information from one source or container
to another, through one conduit or channel or another” (Manson and O’Neill 2007, viii).
ese approaches thereby neglect the importance of the conditions, the manner, and the
ethical requirements of successful communication.
3 “e participant attitude, and the personal reactive attitudes in general, tend to give place,
and it is judged by the civilized should give place, to objective attitudes, just in so far as
the agent is seen as excluded from ordinary adult human relationships by deep-rooted
psychologically abnormality—or simply by being a child” (Strawson 2008, 11).
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derstand this, we need a non-objectivistic as well as non-rationalistic and
non-dualistic notion of the will. Bioethical theories usually identify the will
with a mental event or activity, which is guided by rational grounds within
the inner realm or consciousness of the person and articulated by linguistic
communication. Opposing this account of the will I am going to defend a
notion of the will which
(1) cannot merely be assessed objectively, but has to be communicated
personally;
(2) cannot only be communicated by linguistic statements, but can be
communicated by bodily behavior as well;
(3) is not identical with the statement of the will or the actual volition
but can contradict such a statement or volition, or can, in the case
of the absence of any statements resp. volitions, be presumed on the
basis of other indications and information;
(4) is not reducible to the individual will which itself is only possible
and understandable for others against the background of a “general
will” that forms the general conceptual and bodily framework of
human volition and pursuit.
Aer defending the priority of communication of the will in this section,
I am going to argue for the necessity and equal validity of bodily communi-
cation of the will in the following section.
2.2 From rationalism and dualism to the bodily constitution of
the will
e identication of the will with the rational will ignores the pre-rational,
sensual-emotional conditions of the rational itself and produces a deep, un-
bridgeable gap between reason and sensuality, will and emotion, mind and
body, language and corporeality.is problem becomes evident in opinions
such as the opinion that the real will of the other person can only be found in
his or her verbal messages, and that, if suchmessages are lacking, it is almost
impossible to know the real will of others. In the case ofmentally ill patients,
it may, in special cases, seem to be doubtful if and how their bodily behav-
ior could be interpreted as an expression of mental states at all. But can the
will in general be identied with mental states which are hidden behind the
bodily surface, so that only the subject him- or herself could know and com-
municate his or her will? Is it not obvious that I really will to do and achieve
what I am actually doing and showing in my bodily behavior? It is of course
possible that others’ behavior may intentionally or unintentionally deceive
30 How to Respect the Will of Mentally Ill Persons
us. Kant provides the example of a man who is packing his luggage in order
to make others believe that he is willing to leave his home, whereas he does
not actually want to leave at all. But such acts of deceiving others through
our behavior are possible only because we usually have no reason to doubt
the will of others at all. e will is not a hidden cause of actions, but lies on
the surface of their bodily behavior. In the actual behavior of persons, their
will is oen more clearly manifest than in declarations of intent, which may
bemere wishes or even lies instead of volitions. If someonemakes a promise
but does not do anything to fulll it, we have good reason to doubt that he
or she was really willing to do what he or she promised to do. Sometimes
we even surprise ourselves by our actual manner of action, which may be
dierent from what we thought our will was.
It is not a new insight in the philosophical tradition to pronounce that
the will is not a separate mental cause of the (bodily) act, and that the act
is not an external eect and sign of a hidden mental state, as smoke may
be an eect and sign of a non-visible re. As has become or should have
become clear since Descartes’ times, there can be no causal relation at all
between the mind and the body. Pain is manifest and present in expressive
behavior; the will is manifest and present in visible action. It is only on this
condition that it is possible to hide one’s pain or real will through pretending
something other than one is really feeling or willing. Wittgenstein expressed
this insight by saying: “e will, if it shall not be a kind of wish, must be the
action itself. It must not stop before the action” (Wittgenstein 1980, §615).
Schopenhauer says: “e bodily action is nothing else than the objectied
act of the will; that is, the will which became evident” (Schopenhauer 1974,
§18).
In order to understand the underlying concept of the body and of behav-
ior, it is helpful to refer to the phenomenological distinction between Leib
and Körper; that is, between being a body and having a body. Whereas the
“Körper”, the bodywe have, is themere physical bodywhich can be an object
of scientic investigation like any other physical thing in nature, the “Leib”,
the body we are, is the non-objectiable medium and expression of mental
life and of the person as the subject of life. According to this distinction,
tears, for example, can be regarded as mere uid owing from the eyes, or
as an expression of pain or grief. In a similar way, a movement of some-
body’s arm can be regarded only from the physical point of view as the mere
movement of an object in space or, or from the personal point of view, as
an intentional movement of the person, as an action of greeting or waving,
for example. Usually we see the bodily expressed pain or action directly as
pain or as a specic action unless we have reason to doubt that the person
really feels, means or intends what her behavior shows. us, mental life is
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not an isolated inner realm separate from the body; rather, it is present and
manifest to others in the living body itself.
Understood as “Leib”, the body fullls a double, ambivalent role. On the
one hand, it separates us from others as singular individuals in space and
time so that it is absolutely impossible exactly to perceive, think or feel what
others perceive, think or feel. On the other hand, the body serves asmediator
insofar as it enables us to comprehend and understand each other through
bodily communication. Because our understanding of others is necessar-
ily very limited and fragmentary, we always have to be careful not to falsely
attribute an intention, motivation or will to others which they actually do
not have. Such careless interpretations are oen the reason for wrongful
paternalistic interventions. But these obstacles and limits of understanding
should not lead us to the mistaken view that we would not be able to under-
stand others at all unless they tell us by means of linguistic statements what
they feel, want or intend. Such statements may help, but they may require
even more interpretation and may be even more uncertain than bodily be-
havior.e other person may deceive us and perhaps even herself about her
real emotions, intentions or motives.
In order to shape a rational will with a much wider range in time and
space, we need language, of course. But this is only possible on the basis of
a pre-rational willing or volition in a much broader sense which we share as
sensual-bodily creatures or animals with non-human living beings. In or-
der to understand the specic nature of the rational will, it is necessary to
presuppose a very broad sense of will, as Aristotle and, under newer condi-
tions, Merleau-Ponty did. According to Aristotle, natural life in general has
a teleological structure as a target-oriented—and following Merleau-Ponty,
we could say, intentional—striving. Every living being strives aer its own
specic good. In the case of the human being, this good is a life led accord-
ing to reason and virtue, but this is not possible at all without the basis of
a pre-rational striving which humans share with non-human beings. In the
case of humans, this striving (orexis) is non-rational but, unlike the vegeta-
tive functions of the body, it is guidable and manageable by reason. Insofar
as the rational will (bouleusis) does not start from scratch, as a creatio ex ni-
hilo, it has to be regarded as a natural striving which is specically modied
or qualied by purpose, deliberation and reason, and is possible through
the means of language. e bodily constitution of the rational will means:
e body we are, our “Leib”, is a mediator not only for our communication
with other persons, it is rst of all more generally a mediator for our rela-
tion to the world, or more precisely, as Merleau-Ponty says, it is our being
towards the world (être au monde). is implies that our willing—as our
perceiving, thinking or feeling—is necessarily related and open to the world
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through our body. Our will—as our consciousness in general—would be
helpless und non-existent without the concrete material of the will which
comes about only through our sensual-bodily interaction with the world,
from the very beginning of our existence.
If a child is crying and becomes quiet when fed or when comforted be-
cause of pain, it obviously wanted something to eat or wanted to be com-
forted. If the demented patient is happily playing with animals on a farm,
an activity which, like the German professor of rhetoric Walter Jens, he de-
spised in his former life, it is obvious that he is now willing to live in this
way. By the means of language, the child will acquire the ability to commu-
nicate and describe its needs and desires, to reect on and inuence them
on rational grounds and at times to suspend them accordingly. But this for-
mation of a rational will is not possible unless it is shaped on the basis of
the bodily-constituted willing and unless it is articulated through bodily ex-
pression. is is true even for the highest achievements of reason, science,
and art. A thought, a number or an aesthetic idea are not identical with the
spoken vibrations of air, the ink of the written letter or the chemical paints
of a picture in the sense of physical matter (body as “Körper”); on the other
hand, they cannot exist unless they are articulated in some kind of bodily
expression (body as “Leib”). No one can conceive of these ideas and deal
with them as possible objects of will and action in a merely spiritual man-
ner.us, the body we are, the “Leib”, is necessarily linked to our mind and
vice versa. But in order to understand how it is possible to ascribe a will to
children aswell as to demented persons, and also to animals or dead persons,
we need to dierentiate carefully between these dierent types of cases. And
for this purpose we need to undertake a critical consideration of the fourth
prejudice, the prejudice of individualism.
3. From individualism to the intersubjective constitution of the
will
e view that we cannot know the will of another person unless she explic-
itly informs us is based on the prejudice of individualism insofar as it ignores
the intersubjective constitution of body and language and thereby of mind
and will. As phenomenology has shown, pre-rational sensuality is, from the
very beginning, not entirely chaotic before it is structured by reason. Rather,
according to our bodily constitution, the body itself is already structured
and intentionally directed to the world and other persons in a very complex
manner. Schopenhauer maintains that “the perfect suitability of the human
and animal body for the human and animal will in general” is much more
perfect than the “suitability of a tool for the will of its maker.”e “main ap-
petites” of the will becomemanifest in dierent parts of the body: “teeth and
Theda Rehbock 33
gullet are the objectied hunger; genitalia are the objectied sex drive; the
grasping hands, the rapid feet correspond already more to the more medi-
ate striving of the will which they represent” (Schopenhauer 1974, §20, 168).
According to Merleau-Ponty, the living body (Leib) diers from the physi-
cal body (Körper), whichmay be an object of scientic investigation, insofar
as “nous venons de découvrir jusque dans sa, fonction sexuelle’ une inten-
tionnalité et un pouvoir de signication” (Merleau-Ponty 1945, 203). We do
not understand mental disorders, Merleau-Ponty maintains, unless we ap-
propriately understand the “normal” functioning of mind and body. We do
not understand sexuality if we reduce it to mere biological functions of the
body (Körper). Rather it is “une intentionnalité qui suive le movement de
l’existence et qui échit avec elle” (Merleau-Ponty 1945, 183). erefore we
nd—already in the realm of body and sensuality—“relations and attitudes”
(Merleau-Ponty 1945, 185) as well as structure and order which in the ratio-
nalist philosophical tradition has been reserved for consciousness and rea-
son. Language and reason extend the possibilities of human existence, but
they do not create them. On the other hand, our bodily development as hu-
mans takes place, from the very beginning, in the cultural context of human
society and language. Regarding the body only in the light of its biological
functions is a secondary, reduced view of the body based on abstract think-
ing which blinds us to the cultural and social relations of sense andmeaning
which are present in the living body (Leib).
us, we do not nd body and language as objective facts in the world;
rather, we nd ourselves in a world which is already constituted by com-
monly shared bodily and conceptual structures of communication and cul-
tural life before we are able to develop an individual will. In order to de-
velop an individual will, we must rst to a high degree think, feel and will
what others do. On this basis of a commonly shared body, we immediately
understand the behavior of a crying child or a demented person like Walter
Jens without previous reasoning and interpretation. We especially do not
need any conclusion by analogy that others who behave similarly to us, in
the case of pain, for example, must have similar experiences of pain that we
do. Rather, we comprehend others’ behavior through a pre-rational under-
standing by means of the body (Leib). is means that we are intentionally
related to the world through bodily communication and interaction with
others, within a commonly shared and intricately structured framework, be-
fore we begin to shape an individual willing and personality.
Against this common background, we are able to understand the will of
others in specic situations self-evidently, without any need to ask them. It
is, for example, self-evident that we want to live, to eat, to breathe, to move
freely, to shape our own life and so on. Life is an evaluative concept. Under
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normal conditions, no one would come up with the idea of telling others
that he or she does not want to live, to be free and so on. is is a kind of
“general will” in the sense of Rousseau andKant, although it is not only based
on human reason but on our commonly shared bodily existence as well. It
is only on this basis that we can understand, under special circumstances,
the individual will to end one’s life. is individual will is a modication,
variation or suspension of the commonly shared will to live. us, we are
able to understand self-evidently the will of mentally ill persons as well as
of children and animals, but we naturally draw specic distinctions between
these dierent types of beings and situations too.
Unlike animals, children are (to be) regarded and treated as full mem-
bers of the human society and language community, and thus as persons and
subjects of rights from the very beginning, although their specic rights are
distinct from the rights of adults.4 Kant says: “Children, as persons, have by
their procreation an original innate (not acquired) right to the care of their
parents until they are able to look aer themselves, [. . . ]. For the ospring
is a person, [. . . ]. So from a practical point of view it is a quite correct and
even necessary idea to regard the act of procreation as one by which we have
brought a person into the world without its consent and on our own initia-
tive, forwhich deed the parents incur an obligation tomake the child content
with his condition so far as they can” (Kant 1996, 64). Doing this does not
only mean “to feed and care for him [the child] but to educate him, to de-
velop him both pragmatically [. . . ] and morally [. . . ]” (Kant 1996, 65). e
specic will and corresponding right to be educated and developed can be
ascribed to children from the very beginning without asking them. Only on
this basis can the individual will and right to get a special kind of education
be formed.
Like children—and unlike animals—mentally ill persons are (to be) re-
garded and treated as full members of the human society and language com-
munity and thus as persons and subjects of rights as well. But their specic
situation, and therefore their specicwill, is dierent. Although persons suf-
fering fromdementia, for example, oen behave like children, their situation
is very dierent from the situation of children.is cannot be understood if
their situation is only grasped in terms of lost abilities. Instead, it has to be
considered and comprehended in a broader anthropological framework, as
well as in the personal biographic context of their individual life. As the pos-
sibility of becoming and being ill presupposes life in general, the possibility
4 In the case of animals, it would of course be necessary to distinguish between dierent
kinds of animals with reference to their relation to humans. Domestic animals, for ex-
ample, are (to be) regarded and treated more like members of human society than wild
animals.
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of becoming and beingmentally ill presupposes mental life.is life and the
person as the subject of this life may lose abilities, like memory, for example,
and change seriously, but they do not disappear or become entirely dierent
persons as some philosophers, such as Derik Part, and some bioethicists
think.
We need the power of imagination and free variation (Husserl) of our
familiar forms of life in order to understand others in their individual oth-
erness, radical strangeness, craziness, or insanity, and to respect others even
if we do not understand them at all.e more we are able to use these pow-
ers, the more we can see that a person, reason, and the will do not disappear
in the state of mental illness, but only change. Wittgenstein says: “Madness
must not be seen as an illness. Why not as a sudden—more or less sudden—
change of character?” (Wittgenstein 1977, 106) Wittgenstein thinks in terms
of a variation of the whole form and conceptual grammar of the individ-
ual existence instead of a disorder or lack of function which leads to the
entire dissolution of reason, will and personhood. e remaining continu-
ity of the person, in spite of perhaps severe and radical changes, cannot be
found in objective facts or faculties such as the continuity of mental states
or the functioning memory. Rather, it can only be understood and compre-
hended through communication and a narrative approach, that is, by telling
the story of the person, as, for example, Inge Jens is telling the story ofWalter
Jens and his fate of suering from dementia, losing capacities and suering,
on the one hand, and discovering new capacities and still enjoying life, on
the other hand.
Michel Foucault emphasizes the ethical problem of the objectivist atti-
tude towardmentally ill personswhen he says: “Our society does not want to
recognize itself in the sick person who is cast out or locked in; as soon as she
diagnoses the disease she expels the sick person” (Foucault 1954, 75). us,
discrimination and disregard of the person already happens on a theoretical
level. Instead of regarding mentally ill persons through communication and
interaction within a commonly shared framework and in the perspective of
a personal, participant attitude, these persons are excluded by determining
their deciencies, strangeness and otherness through denition, categoriza-
tion and causal explanation, through “management, treatment, and control”
(Strawson 2008, 17) in the perspective of a merely objectivistic attitude. Be-
cause of their weakness, mentally ill persons are muchmore in danger of be-
ing treated paternalistically, excluded from society and disregarded. ere-
fore, under these conditions, the claim and obligation of respect for auton-
omy and the will does not require less, but even greater eort to understand
and empathize with the person and her situation than in the case of “com-
petent” persons.
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Which consequences can be drawn from this conclusion for the special
case of advance directives? Firstly, it can be questioned if the former “com-
petent” will “not to remain alive in a seriously and permanently demented
state” (Dworkin 1994, 231) can and should really have absolute priority over
the actual bodily behavior expressing the will to live. It can even be ques-
tioned if the former will can and should be regarded as a will at all, or per-
haps much more adequately as a mere wish regarding a future state of one’s
own life, whereas the actual behavior expresses a will in the proper sense of
the word. Schopenhauer says: “Decisions of the will (Willensbeschlüsse) re-
garding the future are mere deliberations of reason about what one is going
to will some day, not real volitions: only the realization seals the decision,
which heretofore remains a changeable purpose and exists only within rea-
son, in abstracto. Only for reection will and action are dierent: in reality
they are one and the same” (Schopenhauer 1974, §18, 158). In the case of
dementia, we cannot be sure what our future wishes and volitions would
be. e future is, by its very nature, open, not only with regard to external
events, but also in respect of the internal life of one’s mind. Furthermore,
in the case of advance directives, the execution of the will or the fullling of
one’s wishes is expected from others.ey know our former wishes, but are
confronted with our actual behavior which expresses our present will and
may also contradict our former wishes andmay therefore create irresolvable
dilemmas and conicts. is consideration may lead us to an insight into
the limits of self-determination in the face of an open future and to a will-
ingness to let us be determined by future possibilities of our outer as well as
inner life, instead of attempting to entirely control them in advance.
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